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Abstract
We introduce the problem of private information delivery (PID), comprised of K messages,
a user, and N servers (each holds M ≤ K messages) that wish to deliver one out of K messages
to the user privately, i.e., without revealing the delivered message index to the user. The
information theoretic capacity of PID, C, is defined as the maximum number of bits of the
desired message that can be privately delivered per bit of total communication to the user. For
the PID problem with K messages, N servers, M messages stored per server, and N ≥ dKM e,
we provide an achievable scheme of rate 1/dKM e and an information theoretic converse of rate
M/K, i.e., the PID capacity satisfies 1/dKM e ≤ C ≤ M/K. This settles the capacity of PID
when KM is an integer. When
K
M is not an integer, we show that the converse rate of M/K
is achievable if N ≥ Kgcd(K,M) − ( Mgcd(K,M) − 1)(bKM c − 1), and the achievable rate of 1/dKM e is
optimal if N = dKM e. Otherwise if dKM e < N < Kgcd(K,M) − ( Mgcd(K,M) − 1)(bKM c − 1), we give an
improved achievable scheme and prove its optimality for several small settings.
Hua Sun (email: hua.sun@unt.edu) is with the Department of Electrical Engineering at the University of North
Texas.
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1 Introduction
Consider a dataset comprised of K identically distributed messages and stored over N servers.
The servers wish to deliver one of the messages to a user without revealing the identity of the
message delivered, i.e., the user does not know which message is delivered to him. For example, the
dataset may be medical records from a hospital and each message represents the medical record of a
patient. The hospital would like to send the medical record of a patient externally (e.g., for analysis
of certain disease that goes beyond the capability of the current hospital), and it is desirable that
the name of the patient is not revealed (i.e., the privacy of the patient is preserved). For another
example, suppose a company outsources some of its user activity log data externally for statistical
analysis, while it does not wish to reveal sensitive information about the user identities (e.g., names,
addresses, groups). We call this problem private1 information delivery (PID).
This PID problem is trivial for a centralized system, i.e., there is a single server that stores all
K messages. In this case, no matter which message the server wishes to deliver, the server simply
sends the message to the user and all K choices are indistinguishable from the user. Recently, a
fully distributed system is studied in [3], where there are K messages and N = K servers, each
stores one message. An example with K = 3 and an optimal private coding strategy are shown
below. Here we have 3 independent messages W1,W2,W3 (one bit each). The servers are equipped
with some correlated random variables z1, z2, z1 + z2 that are independent of the messages and
z1, z2 are two i.i.d. fair coin tosses.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3
Storage W1, z1 W2, z2 W3, z1 + z2
Answer for W1 W1 + z1 z2 z1 + z2
Answer for W2 z1 W2 + z2 z1 + z2
Answer for W3 z1 z2 W3 + z1 + z2
(1)
To ensure information theoretic privacy, we need to guarantee that regardless of the message
index delivered, the answers seen by the user are identically distributed and the decoding rule
remains the same (otherwise, the decoding rule reveals information about the message delivered).
For the scheme above, no matter W1, W2, or W3 is to be delivered, the user sees 3 i.i.d. random
bits and to decode the desired message, he always adds up the 3 answering strings. In [3], it is
proved that the communication rate of 1/3 is optimal, where the rate is defined as the number of
bits privately delivered per bit of total answers sent to the user. For the above N = K and each
server stores M = 1 message case, the maximum rate (termed the capacity, C) is 1/K. Further, it
is necessary for each server to hold 1 bit of correlated randomness and for all servers to hold K − 1
bits of correlated randomness, per message bit.
As the fully distributed and centralized cases are well understood, our goal in this paper is
to study the intermediate partially distributed case - each server stores M out of K messages
(1 ≤ M ≤ K). We are restricted to replicated systems (i.e., we do not allow coded messages
or splitting one message to several servers) in this work2, as a first step towards more complex
1In a previous version of this work [1], the problem is called anonymous information delivery. We make a clear
distinction of privacy and anonymity here, where privacy refers to the behavior or interest of an entity (e.g., which
message is delivered) and anonymity refers to the entities of certain activity (e.g., who pays the bill [2]).
2It turns out that the PID problem is trivial when we may distribute (a distinct part of) each message to each
server as in this case, rate 1 can be achieved easily and the system is essentially centralized in the sense of PID.
Therefore for the PID problem, the more interesting case of distributed systems refers to that some message is not
available at all at some server, and we wish to confuse the user about which message is delivered.
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scenarios and a practical set-up for distributed storage systems. Note that we allow the design of
the M messages stored. That is, we wish to find the best replication strategy and the corresponding
private delivery scheme. The main motivation of this work is to characterize the capacity of PID
for replicated systems, as a function of the number of messages, K, the number of servers, N , and
the number of messages stored per server, M .
As an example, consider the setting where we have K = 3 messages, N = 3 servers and
M = 2 messages are stored per server. The storage and correlated randomness design and the
private coding scheme are shown below. Here each message is made up of two symbols from F5,
W1 = (a1, a2), W2 = (b1, b2) and W3 = (c1, c2). z is a common random variable shared by the
servers and z is uniformly distributed over F5 (independent of the messages).
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3
Storage W1,W2, z W2,W3, z W3,W1, z
Answer for W1
3
2a1 − 12a2 + z −2z −12a1 + 12a2 + z
Answer for W2 2b1 − b2 + z −b1 + b2 − 2z z
Answer for W3 z 3c1 − c2 − 2z −2c1 + c2 + z
(2)
We denote the answer from Server n, n ∈ {1, 2, 3} by An. Note that An is a function of the
storage at Server n. To decode the desired message, in all 3 cases where W1,W2 or W3 is delivered,
the user employs the same decoding strategy, as follows.
Desired Symbol 1 = A1 +A2 +A3 (3)
Desired Symbol 2 = A1 + 2A2 + 3A3 (4)
Further, in all 3 cases, the user receives 3 uniformly random symbols over F5, thus perfect privacy
is achieved. The rate achieved is 2/3 as 2 symbols are delivered over 3 answering symbols. As we
will show later by an information theoretic converse, the rate of 2/3 is also the maximum possible.
Thus the capacity of PID is 2/3 in this case.
The main contribution of this work is summarized next. We first show that 1/dKM e ≤ C ≤M/K
by an achievable scheme of rate 1/dKM e and a converse of rate M/K. As a result, we have C = M/K
when KM ∈ Z. Otherwise, if KM /∈ Z, we prove that when N ≥ Kgcd(K,M)−( Mgcd(K,M)−1)(bKM c−1), the
converse rate of M/K is achievable, and when N = dKM e, the achievable rate of 1/dKM e is optimal.
For the uncovered regime where dKM e < N < Kgcd(K,M) − ( Mgcd(K,M) − 1)(bKM c − 1), we provide an
improved achievable scheme and show that it is optimal for certain small cases. Therefore, we have
characterized the capacity of PID for most cases, and provided approximations for remaining cases.
Notation: For integers N1, N2, N1 ≤ N2, define the notation [N1 : N2] as the set {N1, N1 +
1, · · · , N2} and (N1 : N2) as the vector (N1, N1 + 1, · · · , N2). For an index set I = {i1, i2, · · · , in},
the notation AI represents the set {Ai : i ∈ I}. For an index vector −→I = (i1, i2, · · · , in), the
notation A−→I represents the vector (Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Ain). For sets (vectors) I1, I2, we define I1/I2 as
the set (vectors) of elements that are in I1 and not in I2 (in original order). The notation X ∼ Y
is used to indicate that random variables X and Y are identically distributed. For a matrix F with
i rows and j columns, if we wish to highlight its dimension, we will write Fi×j. For an index vector−→I = (i1, i2, · · · , in), the notation F[−→I ,:] represents the submatrix of F formed by retaining only the
rows corresponding to the elements of the vector
−→I . The notation F
[:,
−→I ] is defined similarly (with
3
respect to the columns). The notation Ij represents the identity matrix with dimension j × j and
the notation 0 represents a matrix where each element is 0.
2 Problem Statement
Consider K independent messages W1, · · · ,WK . Each message is comprised of L i.i.d. uniform
symbols from a finite field Fp. In p-ary units,
H(W1) = · · · = H(WK) = L, (5)
H(W1, · · · ,WK) = H(W1) + · · ·+H(WK). (6)
There are N servers, and each server stores M out of the K messages. We denote the storage
variable at Server n as Sn.
Sn = WSn , Sn ⊂ [1 : K], |Sn| = M. (7)
The servers share a common random variable Z, and Z is independent of the messages.
H(Z,W1, · · · ,WK) = H(Z) +H(W1) + · · ·+H(WK). (8)
The servers privately generate θ ∈ [1 : K] and wish to deliver Wθ to a user while keeping θ
a secret from the user. Depending on θ, there are K strategies that the servers could employ to
privately deliver the desired message. For example, if θ = k, then in order to deliver Wk, Server
n ∈ [1 : N ] sends an answer A[k]n to the user. The answer A[k]n is a function of Sn, Z,
∀k ∈ [1 : K], n ∈ [1 : N ], H(A[k]n |Sn, Z) = 0. (9)
From all N answers, the user decodes the desired message with zero error.
H(Wk|A[k]1 , A[k]2 , · · · , A[k]N ) = 0. (10)
To ensure privacy, the communication strategies must be indistinguishable (identically distributed)
from the perspective of the user, i.e., the following privacy constraint must be satisfied, ∀k ∈ [1 : K],
[Privacy] (A
[1]
1 , A
[1]
2 , · · · , A[1]N ,W1) ∼ (A[k]1 , A[k]2 , · · · , A[k]N ,Wk). (11)
The privacy constraint (11) is equivalent to the condition that the answers are i.i.d. and the
(deterministic) decoding mappings from the answers to the desired message are the same for all k.
The PID rate characterizes how many symbols of desired information are delivered per symbol
of total delivery, and is defined as
R , L∑N
n=1Dn
(12)
where Dn is the number of symbols sent from Server n to the user.
A rate R is said to be achievable if there exists a PID scheme of rate greater than or equal to
R, for which zero error decoding is guaranteed. The supremum of achievable rates (over all storage
design S1, S2, · · · , SN and all PID schemes) is called the capacity C.
The randomness size η measures the amount of common randomness at the servers relative to
the message size.
η =
H(Z)
L
. (13)
In this work, we focus on the capacity C and allow as much common randomness as needed.
4
3 Results
In this section, we state the main results of this work. We start with an approximation of the PID
capacity, stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For the private information delivery problem with K messages, N ≥ dKM e servers and
M messages per server, the capacity satisfies
1/dK
M
e ≤ C ≤M/K. (14)
We need N ≥ dKM e because otherwise the total storage available at all servers, NM , is smaller
than the number of messages, K, and we can not guarantee that all messages can be delivered
correctly. To prove Theorem 1, we provide an achievable scheme of rate 1/dKM e and a converse of
rate M/K. The details are presented in Section 4.
The bounds in Theorem 1 match when KM is an integer. Therefore, in this case, we obtain the
exact capacity of PID, stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 For the private information delivery problem with K messages, N servers and M
messages per server, if KM ∈ Z, N ≥ KM , the capacity is C = M/K.
Remark: When N = K,M = 1 (the fully distributed system), C = 1/K and this recovers the
capacity result of Theorem 1 in [3]. When M = K, we have the fully centralized system and C = 1.
When KM is not an integer, the bounds in Theorem 1 represent a reasonable approximation of
the PID capacity. The inverse of the capacity ( 1C , referred to as the optimal download cost) is
characterized to within a 1 symbol gap (= dK/Me −K/M).
Next, we proceed to consider the conditions on the number of servers N such that the bounds
in Theorem 1 are tight.
Theorem 2 For the private information delivery problem with K messages, N ≥ dKM e servers,
M messages per server, and KM /∈ Z, the converse rate of M/K is achievable if N ≥ Kgcd(K,M) −
( Mgcd(K,M) − 1)(bKM c − 1), and the achievable rate of 1/dKM e is optimal if N = dKM e.
The proof of Theorem 2 is presented in Section 5.
Combining Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we have characterized the PID capacity when the number
of servers is either small or large. In particular, the full regime is characterized when M = 2. This
result is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 For the private information delivery problem with K messages, N servers and M = 2
messages per server, the capacity is
C =

2/K when N ≥ dK2 e+ 1
1/dK2 e when N = dK2 e
0 when N < dK2 e
(15)
Proof: The case for even K is obvious (covered in Corollary 1) and we only need to consider the
case when K is odd. We prove that dK2 e+ 1 = Kgcd(K,M) − ( Mgcd(K,M) − 1)(bKM c − 1), when M = 2.
Plugging in M = 2 to the RHS, we have K − bK2 c+ 1 = LHS and the proof is complete.
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Note that when M = 2, the difference between the two thresholds
(
dKM e and Kgcd(K,M) −
( Mgcd(K,M) − 1)(bKM c− 1)
)
on N is exactly 1. Then we know that the thresholds (conditions for the
bounds in Theorem 1 to be tight) can not be improved in general.
The results obtained so far are summarized in Figure 1. Beyond the intermediate regime
dKM e < N < Kgcd(K,M) − ( Mgcd(K,M) − 1)(bKM c − 1), we have characterized the PID capacity. The
range of N in this regime is at most 2Mgcd(K,M) − 1, i.e.,
K
gcd(K,M)
− ( M
gcd(K,M)
− 1)(bK
M
c − 1)− dK
M
e
=
M
gcd(K,M)
K
M
− M
gcd(K,M)
(bK
M
c − 1) + bK
M
c − dK
M
e − 1 (16)
=
M
gcd(K,M)
(
K
M
− bK
M
c+ 1) + bK
M
c − dK
M
e − 1 < 2M
gcd(K,M)
− 1 (17)
Finally, we consider this intermediate regime and present an improved achievable scheme, in the
following theorem.
0
N
C
dK
M
e
1=dK
M
e
M=K
K
gcd(K;M)
` ( M
gcd(K;M)
` 1)(bK
M
c ` 1)
Figure 1: The PID capacity. When N ≤ dKM e and N ≥ Kgcd(K,M) − ( Mgcd(K,M) − 1)(bKM c − 1), the capacity
is fully characterized (colored in red) and otherwise, the capacity is open in general (colored in purple).
Theorem 3 For the private information delivery problem with K messages, N servers, and M
messages per server, when KM /∈ Z and dKM e < N < Kgcd(K,M)−( Mgcd(K,M)−1)(bKM c−1), the capacity
satisfies
C ≥ l
N + (l − 1)(bKM c − 1)
, where l = b(N − b
K
M c+ 1)M
K − (bKM c − 1)M
c. (18)
The proof of Theorem 3 is presented in Section 6. To illustrate Theorem 3, we give two examples.
Example 1 Suppose M = 3,K = 7. The only N value that is covered in Theorem 3 is N = 4.
The achievable rate in Theorem 3 is 2/5. It turns out that this achievable rate is also optimal (proof
deferred to Section 7.2). Therefore, we have characterized the capacity of PID for all possible values
of N when M = 3,K = 7. This result is plotted in Figure 2(a).
Example 2 Suppose M = 4,K = 5. The only N values that are covered in Theorem 3 are
N = 3, 4. The achievable rate in Theorem 3 is 2/3 (when N = 3), and 3/4 (when N = 4). It turns
out that the achievable rates are also optimal (proof deferred to Section 7.1). Therefore, we have
characterized the capacity of PID for all possible values of N when M = 4,K = 5. This result is
plotted in Figure 2(b).
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: The PID capacity, (a) when M = 3,K = 7, and (b), when M = 4,K = 5.
Remark: The achievable rate in Theorem 3 may not be monotonically increasing in N . So for a
given N , if we want to find the highest achievable rate, we may search over all N ′ ∈ [dKM e+ 1 : N ].
Remark: The achievable scheme in Theorem 3 includes those in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 as
special cases. That is, if we set N = dKM e, the rate achieved in Theorem 3 is R = 1/dKM e (same
as that in Theorem 1), and if we set N = Kgcd(K,M) − ( Mgcd(K,M) − 1)(bKM c − 1), the rate achieved in
Theorem 3 is R = M/K (same as that in Theorem 2).
4 Proof of Theorem 1
4.1 Converse: R ≤M/K
Let us start with two useful lemmas. The first lemma states that if a message is available at a set
of servers, then the size of the answers from these servers must be no less than the message size.
Lemma 1 Consider any storage strategy where Wk is only available at servers in the set Nk =
{nk1 , nk2 , · · · , nki}, i.e., Wk ∈ Sj , ∀j ∈ Nk, and Wk /∈ Sl, ∀l /∈ Nk. We have
DNΣk
4
= Dnk1 +Dnk2 + · · ·+Dnki ≥ L (19)
Proof:
L
(5)
= H(Wk) (20)
(10)
= I(Wk;A
[k]
1 , A
[k]
2 , · · · , A[k]N ) (21)
= I(Wk;A
[k]
[1:N ]/Nk) + I(Wk;A
[k]
Nk |A
[k]
[1:N ]/Nk) (22)
≤ I(Wk;A[k][1:N ]/Nk ,W[1:K]/k, Z) +H(A
[k]
Nk) (23)
(8)(11)
≤ I(Wk;A[k][1:N ]/Nk |W[1:K]/k, Z) +DNΣk (24)
(7)
= I(Wk;A
[k]
[1:N ]/Nk |W[1:K]/k, Z, S
[k]
[1:N ]/Nk) +DNΣk (25)
(9)
= DNΣk (26)
where (25) follows from the constraint that Wk is not available at Server l,∀l ∈ [1 : N ]/Nk so that
S
[k]
[1:N ]/Nk ⊂W[1:K]/k.
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The second lemma states that having multiple servers storing the same set of messages does
not help to reduce the private delivery rate.
Lemma 2 Consider any storage strategy S1, S2, · · · , SN with N ′ ≤ N distinct Si storage variables.
Without loss of generality, assume Si 6= Sj , ∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ [1 : N ′]. Then any rate R that is achievable
with N servers and the storage strategy S1, S2, · · · , SN is also achievable with N ′ servers and the
storage strategy S1, S2, · · · , SN ′.
Proof: Suppose we are given a PID scheme (described by NK answers A
[k]
n , n ∈ [1 : N ], k ∈ [1 :
K]) that operates over N servers with the storage strategy S1, S2, · · · , SN , where S1, · · · , SN ′ are
distinct. Denote the set of server indices for which the storage variables are equal to Si, i ∈ [1 : N ′]
by Mi, i.e., if j ∈ Mi, then Sj = Si. Then we have N ′ disjoint Mi sets that form a partition of
the N servers, i.e., M1 ∪M2 ∪ · · ·MN ′ = [1 : N ], and Mi1 ∩Mi2 = ∅,∀i1 6= i2, i1, i2 ∈ [1 : N ′].
Next we will construct a PID scheme that operates over N ′ servers with the storage strategy
S1, S2, · · · , SN ′ and achieves the same rate as the N -server scheme above. We will use notations
with a tilde symbol to describe the N ′-server scheme. The common random variable remains the
same, Z˜ = Z. The answer from Server i to deliver W˜k is denoted by A˜
[k]
i . We set
A˜
[k]
i = A
[k]−−→Mi
, ∀n ∈ [1 : N ′], k ∈ [1 : K] (27)
where
−→Mi is a vector that is in increasing order of the elements in the set Mi. Note that the
storage variable of all servers in the set Mi is the same as that of Server i, so that we may set the
answers as above (refer to (9)). After collecting all N ′ answers, we have
(A˜
[k]
1 , · · · , A˜[k]N ′) = A permutation of (A[k]1 , · · · , A[k]N ) (28)
so that we may use the decoding mapping (the order of the arguments in the mapping is corre-
spondingly permuted) from the N -server scheme to decode W˜k. From (27) and (28), it is easy
to see that the privacy constraint inherits and the same rate is preserved. The proof is therefore
complete.
We are now ready to show that R ≤ M/K. From Lemma 2, we may assume without loss of
generality that the storage variables Sn, n ∈ [1 : N ] are distinct. Note that Sn is comprised of
M out of K messages, so we have at most
(
K
M
)
distinct Sn variables. In other words, we may
assume N =
(
K
M
)
(note that having more servers can not hurt). Further, suppose the sets of stored
messages S1, · · · ,SN are ordered lexicographically. Consider any message Wk, k ∈ [1 : K], and Wk
is available at
(
K−1
M−1
)
servers and this set of servers is denoted by Nk, where |Nk| =
(
K−1
M−1
)
. From
Lemma 1, we have
L ≤ DNΣk (29)
Adding (29) for all k ∈ [1 : K], we have
KL ≤
K∑
k=1
DNΣk = M
N∑
n=1
Dn (30)
where the last step follows from symmetry and any Dn, n ∈ [1 : N ] appears M times (Server n
contains M messages and Dn appears once for each message). Rearranging terms gives us the rate
bound and completes the proof:
R =
L∑N
n=1Dn
≤M/K. (31)
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4.2 Achievability: R ≥ 1/dK
M
e
We provide a scheme with N = dKM e servers. Suppose each message is comprised of L = 1 symbol
from F2 (in fact, any field will work). The common random variable Z consists of N − 1 i.i.d.
symbols, each from the same field F2. We denote Z = (z1, · · · , zN−1).
The storage design is trivial, where the messages are stored sequentially over the servers.
S1 = {W1,W2, · · · ,WM} (32)
S2 = {WM+1,WM+2, · · · ,W2M} (33)
... (34)
SN = {W(N−1)M+1, · · · ,WK} (35)
Suppose Wk, k ∈ [1 : K] is desired. The delivery scheme is linear, and each answer has Di =
1,∀i ∈ [1 : N ] symbol. Then the rate achieved is R = L/∑iDi = 1/N = 1/dKM e, as desired. The
answers are shown below.
A
[k]
i = zi + 1(k ∈ [(i− 1)M + 1 : iM ])Wk, i ∈ [1 : N − 1], (36)
A
[k]
N = −z1 − · · · − zN−1 + 1(k ∈ [(N − 1)M + 1 : K])Wk (37)
where 1(x) denotes the indicator function that is equal to 1 if x is true and 0 otherwise. Note that
the answering symbol from Server i contains Wk only if Wk is available at Server i.
To decode the desired message symbols, we add the N answering symbols.
Wk = A
[k]
1 +A
[k]
2 + · · ·+A[k]N (38)
where all common randomness cancels and the desired message retains as it only appears once (in
the answer from the server where it is stored). Note that the same decoding mapping is used for
all k.
We next show that the privacy constraint (11) is satisfied. To this end, note that regardless of
the vale of the desired message index k, the answers are uniformly random, i.e.,
H(A
[k]
1 , · · · , A[k]N ) = N. (39)
Therefore, the scheme is both correct and private.
Finally, we note that N − 1 randomness symbols are used to send L = 1 message symbol. The
randomness size is then η = H(Z)/L = N − 1 = 1/R− 1.
5 Proof of Theorem 2
5.1 N = K
gcd(K,M)
− ( M
gcd(K,M)
− 1)(bK
M
c − 1): Achievability of R =M/K
5.1.1 Example with K = 8,M = 3
To illustrate the main idea in a simpler setting, we first consider an example with K = 8,M = 3
so that N = 8− (3− 1)(2− 1) = 6 and we show that R = M/K = 3/8 is achievable.
Suppose the message size L = 3 symbols, and each symbol is from Fp, where p ≥ 8. Then
Wk, k ∈ [1 : 8] is a 3 × 1 vector. The common random variable consists of 5 i.i.d. symbols from
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the same field Fp, i.e., Z ∈ F5×1p . The storage is designed as follows, where the first 5 servers
store M = 3 messages out of W1,W2,W3,W4,W5 in a cyclic manner and the last server stores the
remaining 3 messages W6,W7,W8.
S1 = {W1,W2,W3} (40)
S2 = {W2,W3,W4} (41)
S3 = {W3,W4,W5} (42)
S4 = {W4,W5,W1} (43)
S5 = {W5,W1,W2} (44)
S6 = {W6,W7,W8} (45)
Let us start with the case where W1 is desired. The delivery scheme is linear, and the first 5
answer has Di = 1,∀i ∈ [1 : 5] symbol each while the last answer has D6 = 3 symbols. Then the
rate achieved is R = L/
∑
iDi = 3/8, as desired. The collection of the answers is shown below.
Define W1 = (a1, a2, a3), Z = (z1, z2, z3, z4, z5).
A[1] ,

A
[1]
1
A
[1]
2
A
[1]
3
A
[1]
4
A
[1]
5
A
[1]
6

=

f
[1]
1 h1
01×3 h2
01×3 h3
f
[1]
4 h4
f
[1]
5 h5
03×3 H6


a1
a2
a3
z1
z2
z3
z4
z5

(46)
where in answer A
[1]
i , i ∈ [1 : 5] from Server i, f [1]i is a 1×3 precoding vector for the message symbols
W1 ∈ F3×1p and hi is a 1 × 5 precoding vector for the common randomness symbols Z ∈ F5×1p . In
answer A
[1]
6 , the 3 × 3 precoding matrix F[1]6 for W1 is set as the zero matrix and H6 is the 3 × 5
precoding matrix for Z. Note that as W1 is not stored at Servers 2, 3, 6, f
[1]
2 , f
[1]
3 ,F
[1]
6 must be zero.
It turns out that in our scheme, the precoding vectors for the common randomness do not depend
on the desired message index. Define
F
[1]
8×3 ,

f
[1]
1
03×1
03×1
f
[1]
4
f
[1]
5
03×3

, H8×5 ,

h1
h2
h3
h4
h5
H6
 (47)
and (46) may be re-written as
A[1] = [F[1] H]
[
W1
Z
]
= F[1]W1 +HZ. (48)
To decode the 3 desired message symbols from the 8 answering symbols, we apply a 3 × 8 linear
filtering matrix G3×8 to A[1]. We have
W1 =
 a1a2
a3
 = GA[1] = GF[1]W1 +GHZ, (49)
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and to satisfy (49), we set
GF[1] = I3 ⇒ G[:,(1,4,5)]F[1][(1,4,5),:] = I3, (50)
GH = 03×5. (51)
Note that G[:,(1,4,5)],F
[1]
[(1,4,5),:] are both square matrices.
The situation where Wk, k ∈ [2 : 8] is desired is similar. The answers are
A[k] = F[k]Wk +HZ (52)
and the decoding constraints are (the answers are projected onto G to decode the desired message)
G[:,(1,2,5)]F
[2]
[(1,2,5),:] = I3, (53)
G[:,(1,2,3)]F
[3]
[(1,2,3),:] = I3, (54)
G[:,(2,3,4)]F
[4]
[(2,3,4),:] = I3, (55)
G[:,(3,4,5)]F
[5]
[(3,4,5),:] = I3, (56)
G[:,(6,7,8)]F
[j]
[(6,7,8),:] = I3, j ∈ [6 : 8] (57)
GH = 03×5. (58)
Note that the same decoding mapping G must be used for each desired message. So the delivery
design reduces to find a realization of the matrices G,F[1],F[2], · · · ,F[8],H such that (50), (51),
(53) - (58) are satisfied.
These matrices are chosen as follows. We first set
G =
[
I3 V3×5
]
(59)
where
V3×5 =

1
α1−β1
1
α1−β2
1
α1−β3
1
α1−β4
1
α1−β5
1
α2−β1
1
α2−β2
1
α2−β3
1
α2−β4
1
α2−β5
1
α3−β1
1
α3−β2
1
α3−β3
1
α3−β4
1
α3−β5
 , αi, βj , i ∈ [1 : 5], j ∈ [1 : 3] are all distinct.(60)
It is guaranteed that we can find such αi, βj because the field size p ≥ 8. In other words, V is a
Cauchy matrix where each square sub-matrix is invertible. Then H is solved from (51), as the right
null space of G.
H =
[
V3×5
−I5
]
. (61)
Next, the submatrices of F[k], k ∈ [1 : 8] are set as the inverse matrices of corresponding submatrices
of G, from (50), (53) - (57). Note that it is easy to see the corresponding submatrices of G have
full rank such that their inverse matrices exist. Then F[k] are fully determined as the rows that
have not appeared are zero vectors, due to the storage constraint. Now all correctness constraints
are satisfied. We are left to show that the privacy constraint (11) is satisfied. To this end, we show
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that regardless of the vale of the desired message index k, the answers are uniformly random, which
translates to that the following matrices have full rank.
(Equivalent Privacy Condition): B
[k]
8×8 , [F[k] H], ∀k ∈ [1 : 8] have full rank. (62)
As each F[k] contains 5 zero rows, it suffices to show that any 5 rows of H are linearly independent
(holds trivially by the determinant formula of Cauchy matrices). A more detailed proof will be
presented in the general proof.
The construction of the matrices is not unique. In fact, it is not hard to show that if we choose
each element of G i.i.d. and uniformly from a sufficiently large field and follow the above procedure
to determine F[k] and H, then the solution will work with a high probability.
Finally, we note that 5 randomness symbols are used to send 3 message symbols. The random-
ness size is then η = H(Z)/L = 5/3 = 1/R− 1.
5.1.2 General proof with arbitrary K,M
We show that for K messages, M messages per server, and N = Kgcd(K,M) − ( Mgcd(K,M) −1)(bKM c−1)
servers, the rate R = M/K is achievable.
We treat every gcd(K,M) messages as a block so that we have K , Kgcd(K,M) message blocks.
Define
W b = {W(b−1) gcd(K,M)+1,W(b−1) gcd(K,M)+2, · · · ,Wb gcd(K,M)}, b ∈ [1 : K]. (63)
Each server now is able to store M , Mgcd(K,M) message blocks.
Suppose the message size L = M symbols. Each symbol is from Fp, where p ≥ K. The common
random variable Z consists of K − L i.i.d. symbols, each from the same field Fp.
We divide the N servers into 2 sets. The first set is made up of the first N1 servers and the
second set is made up of the last N2 servers, where
N2 = bK
M
c − 1 (64)
N1 = N −N2 (65)
The message blocks also are divided into 2 sets, where the first set is comprised of the first N1
message blocks and the second set is comprised of the remaining K −N1 message blocks.
The storage is designed as follows. In the first server set, each server stores L (= M) message
blocks out of the first message set in a cyclic manner. In the second server set, each server stores
L distinct message blocks from the second message set sequentially.
S1 = {W 1,W 2, · · · ,WL} (66)
S2 = {W 2,W 3, · · · ,WL+1} (67)
... (68)
SN1 = {WN1 ,W 1, · · · ,WL−1} (69)
SN1+1 = {WN1+1,WN1+2, · · · ,WN1+L} (70)
... (71)
SN = {WN1+(N2−1)L+1, · · · ,WN1+N2L} (72)
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To see that all messages are stored, we show that the last message block WN1+N2L is indeed WK ,
N1 +N2L = (N −N2) +N2M (73)
= N + (bK
M
c − 1)(M − 1) (Using the definition of N2) (74)
= K. (Using the definition of N) (75)
Suppose Wk, k ∈ [1 : K] is desired. The delivery scheme is linear, where each answer from the
first server set has Di = 1, ∀i ∈ [1 : N1] symbol, and each answer from the second server set has
Di = L,∀i ∈ [N1 + 1 : N ] symbols. Then the rate achieved is
R =
L∑
iDi
=
L
N1 + LN2
(75)
= M/K = M/K (76)
and it matches the desired rate expression. The answers are shown below.
A
[k]
i = F
[k]
i Wk +HiZ (77)
where if i ∈ [1 : N1], F[k]i has dimension 1 × L, Hi has dimension 1 × (K − L), and otherwise if
i ∈ [N1 + 1 : N ], F[k]i has dimension L× L, Hi has dimension L× (K − L). Define
F
[k]
K×L = [F
[k]
1 ;F
[k]
2 ; · · · ;F[k]N ], (78)
HK×(K−L) = [H1;H2; · · · ;HN ] (79)
and we have the collection of all answers,
A[k] = [F[k] H]
[
Wk
Z
]
= F[k]Wk +HZ. (80)
We next specify the availability set Nk of Wk, i.e., Wk is only available at Server n where n ∈ Nk.
Note that Wk belongs to message block W k, where k , d kgcd(K,M)e.
Nk =
{
[k − L+ 1 : k] mod N1 if k ∈ [1 : N1],
d(k¯ −N1)/Me else k ∈ [N1 + 1 : K]. (81)
Due to the above storage constraints, we have the following corresponding constraints on the
precoding matrices.
If k ∈ [1 : N1], F[k]n1 = 01×L, ∀n1 /∈ Nk, n1 ∈ [1 : N1], F[k]n2 = 0L×L,∀n2 ∈ [N1 + 1 : N ]
else k ∈ [N1 + 1 : K], F[k]n1 = 01×L, ∀n1 ∈ [1 : N1], F[k]n2 = 0L×L, ∀n2 /∈ Nk, n2 ∈ [N1 + 1 : N ]
(82)
To decode the L desired message symbols from the K answering symbols, we apply a linear
filtering matrix GL×K to A
[k]. We have
Wk = GA
[k] = GF[k]Wk +GHZ, (83)
and to satisfy (83), we set
GF[k] = IL ⇒
If k ∈ [1 : N1], G[:,−→N k]F
[k]
[
−→N k,:]
= IL,
else k ∈ [N1 + 1 : K], G[:,N1+(Nk−N1−1)L+1:N1+(Nk−N1)L]F[k]Nk = IL
(84)
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GH = 0L×(K−L) (85)
where the vector
−→N k is in increasing order of elements in the set Nk (the available set for message
Wk). For example, suppose M = 6,K = 20, k = 2. Then gcd(M,K) = 2, N = 6, N1 = 4, N2 =
2, L = 3, k = 1, N2 = {3, 4, 1}, and −→N 2 = (1, 3, 4).
We next find matrices G,F[1],F[2], · · · ,F[K],H such that (84), (85) are satisfied for all k ∈ [1 :
K]. We first set
G =
[
IL VL×(K−L)
]
(86)
where VL×(K−L) is a Cauchy matrix such that the element in i-th row and j-th column is given by
Vij =
1
αi − βj (87)
and αi, βj are distinct elements over Fp where p ≥ K. Then H is solved from (85) as the right null
space of G. The non-zero rows of F[k] are solved from (84), as the inverse of some sub-matrices of
G.
H =
[
VL×(K−L)
−IK−L
]
, (88)
F
[k]
[
−→N k,:]
= G−1
[:,
−→N k]
, if k ∈ [1 : N1],
F
[k]
Nk = G
−1
[:,N1+(Nk−N1−1)L+1:N1+(Nk−N1)L], else k ∈ [N1 + 1 : K].
(89)
Note that if k ∈ [1 : N1], −→N k consists of L cyclicly consecutive elements in [1 : N1] such that
G
[:,
−→N k] is non-singular (its determinant is equal to the determinant of a square Cauchy matrix),
and otherwise if k ∈ [N1 + 1 : K], G[:,N1+(Nk−N1−1)L+1:N1+(Nk−N1)L] consists of L consecutive
columns from G and is non-singular as well.
Now all correctness constraints are satisfied. We are left to show that the privacy constraint
(11) is satisfied. To this end, we show that regardless of the vale of the desired message index k,
the answers are uniformly random, i.e.,
H(A[k]) = K = H(Wk, Z). (90)
From (80), it is equivalent to show that
(Equivalent Privacy Condition): B
[k]
K×K = [F
[k] H], ∀k ∈ [1 : K] have full rank. (91)
First, consider the case where k ∈ [1 : N1]. From (82), we know that N −L cyclicly consecutive
rows (where the row index does not belong to the set Nk) of F[k] are the zero vectors. It follows
from the determinant formula of a 2× 2 block matrix with a zero sub-block that
det(B[k]) = det(F
[k]
[
−→N k,:]
) det(H
[(1:K)/
−→N k,:]) (92)
We have shown that F
[k]
[
−→N k,:]
is non-singular. Further |H
[(1:K)/
−→N k,:]| is equal to the determinant of
a square sub-matrix of a Cauchy matrix (and is another Cauchy matrix) so that H
[(1:K)/
−→N k,:] is
non-singular as well.
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Second, consider the case where k ∈ [N1 + 1 : K]. The proof is similar to that above, where
the non-zero part of the F[k] component is a non-singular square matrix (refer to (89)) and the
corresponding sub-matrix of the H component in the determinant formula (refer to (92)) has a
determinant that is given by a square sub-matrix of a Cauchy matrix (thus non-singular as well).
Therefore, B[k] always have full rank and the scheme is private.
Finally, we note that K − L randomness symbols are used to send L message symbols. The
randomness size is then η = H(Z)/L = (K − L)/L = (K −M)/M = 1/R− 1.
Remark: An interesting observation of our scheme is that it is automatically secure, i.e., from
the answers for Wk, the user learns absolutely no information about other messages. This indicates
that the undelivered messages do not play a role in keeping privacy (the common randomness is
responsible for privacy).
5.2 N = dK
M
e: Optimality of R = 1/dK
M
e
We first show that when N = dKM e, each server must contain a message that appears only in that
server (not available in any other servers). That is, we have
(Property 1) For any i ∈ [1 : N ], there exists a message Wki ∈ Si, and Wki /∈ Sj ,∀j 6= i, j ∈
[1 : N ].
We now prove that Property 1 holds. To set up the proof by contradiction, suppose there exists
1 server (say Server n) where every stored message appears at some other server. As each server
stores M messages, we know that the M messages stored at Server n are replicated at least twice.
As a result, the total storage required at all N servers is at least K + M . However, this is not
possible because K +M exceeds the total storage capability of the servers, MN .
MN = M × dK
M
e (93)
< M ×
(
K
M
+ 1
)
= K +M (94)
So we have proved that Property 1 is satisfied. Consider these N messages Wk1 , · · · ,WkN , where
each of them is available at only 1 (distinct) server. Using Lemma 1 for Wki , we have
Nki = {i} : Di ≥ L (95)
Adding (95) for all i ∈ [1 : N ], we have
D1 + · · ·+DN ≥ NL (96)
⇒ R = L∑N
n=1Dn
≤ 1/N = 1/dK
M
e (97)
and the proof is complete.
6 Proof of Theorem 3
The achievable scheme is similar to that presented in Section 5.1.2 (albeit with a different set of
parameters). Here we present the code construction succinctly and only highlight the differences.
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We show that for K messages, M messages per server, and N servers, the following rate is
achievable.
R =
l
N + (l − 1)(bKM c − 1)
, where l = b(N − b
K
M c+ 1)M
K − (bKM c − 1)M
c. (98)
The N servers and K messages are similarly divided into 2 sets. The first server set is made up
of the first N1 = N − N2 servers and the second server set is made up of the last N2 = bKM c − 1
servers. The first message set is comprised of the first K1 = K − K2 messages and the second
message set is comprised of the last K2 = N2M messages.
Suppose the message size L = l symbols. Define DΣ , N1 +LN2. Each message symbol is from
Fp, where p ≥ DΣ. The common random variable Z consists of DΣ − L i.i.d. symbols, each from
the same field Fp.
The storage is designed as follows. The first (second) message set is stored over the first (second)
server set. Consider the first server set, where the N1 servers can store N1M messages. Note that
there are K1 messages in the first message set so that at least, each of these K1 messages can be
stored l = bN1M/K1c times (refer to (98)). Imagine these N1M locations as an N1×M table with
N1 rows and M columns. Consider the N1M locations of the table in a greedily manner, first from
the first row to the last row and then from the first column to the last column, and we throw the
K1l messages (from W1 to WK1 , each message replicated l times) into the locations in the order
specified. The desired property of this storage strategy is that each message Wi, i ∈ [1 : K − 1] is
available at l cyclicly consecutive servers in the first server set. Denote the availability set of Wk
as Nk. In the second server set, each server stores L distinct messages from the second message set
sequentially.
For instance, consider the setting in Example 1, where M = 3,K = 7, N = 4. Then N2 =
1, N1 = 3,K2 = 3,K1 = 4 and the storage design is as follows.
S1 = {W1,W2,W4} (99)
S2 = {W1,W3,W4} (100)
S3 = {W2,W3} (101)
S4 = {W5,W6,W7} (102)
Suppose Wk, k ∈ [1 : K] is desired. In the linear delivery scheme, each answer from the first
server set has Di = 1,∀i ∈ [1 : N1] symbol, and each answer from the second server set has
Di = L,∀i ∈ [N1 + 1 : N ] symbols. Then the rate achieved is R = LN1+LN2 = lN+(l−1)N2 , as desired
(refer to (98)).
The answers are shown below.
A
[k]
i = F
[k]
i Wk +HiZ (103)
where
if i ∈ [1 : N1], F[k]i is a 1× L vector, and Hi is a 1× (DΣ − L) vector,
else i ∈ [N1 + 1 : N ], F[k]i is an L× L matrix, and Hi is an L× (DΣ − L) matrix.
(104)
Then the collection of all answers are as follows.
A[k] = F
[k]
DΣ×LWk +HDΣ×(DΣ−L)Z, (105)
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where F[k] = [F
[k]
1 ;F
[k]
2 ; · · · ;F[k]N ],H = [H1;H2; · · · ;HN ]. (106)
The decoding filtering matrix is denoted by GL×DΣ . Then we have
Wk = GA
[k] = GF[k]Wk +GHZ, (107)
⇒ GF[k] = IL ⇒
If k ∈ [1 : K1], G[:,−→N k]F
[k]
[
−→N k,:]
= IL,
else k ∈ [K1 + 1 : K], G[:,N1+(Nk−N1−1)L+1:N1+(Nk−N1)L]F[k]Nk = IL,
(108)
GH = 0L×(DΣ−L) (109)
and all other unspecified sub-matrices of F[k] are zero matrices, due to the storage constraint.
To satisfy (108), (109), we set G,F[1],F[2], · · · ,F[K],H as follows.
G =
[
IL VL×(DΣ−L)
]
, where V is a Cauchy matrix such that Vij =
1
αi−βj , αi 6= βj ,
. H =
[
VL×(DΣ−L);−IDΣ−L
]
, (110)
F
[k]
[
−→N k,:]
= G−1
[:,
−→N k]
, if k ∈ [1 : K1],
F
[k]
Nk = G
−1
[:,N1+(Nk−N1−1)L+1:N1+(Nk−N1)L], else k ∈ [K1 + 1 : K].
(111)
By the same reasoning as that in Section 5.1.2, the matrices in (111) have full rank so that their in-
verse matrices are well defined. Now correctness constraints are satisfied, and privacy is guaranteed
by the observation that
H(A[k]) = DΣ = H(Wk, Z) (112)
⇐⇒ B[k]DΣ×DΣ = [F[k] H], ∀k ∈ [1 : K] have full rank. (113)
The proof for B[k] being full rank follows similarly from that in Section 5.1.2 and the details are
thus omitted.
7 Optimality of Achievable Schemes for Examples 1 and 2
We present the proof for Example 2 first because it is simpler. The proof idea for both examples is
the same - we consider all possible storage strategies and show that none of them may outperform
the achieved rate. For each storage strategy, we argue that certain combinatoric structure must
exist and the structure leads to a rate upper bound (using Lemma 1)3.
7.1 Example 2. M = 4, K = 5
We have two settings to consider, i.e., N = 3 and N = 4.
7.1.1 N = 3: Proof of R ≤ 2/3
We assume without loss of generality that each server stores M = 4 distinct messages (because
storing more messages does not hurt). Then we have K = 5 messages and MN = 12 messages are
stored across all servers. Denote Nk, k ∈ [1 : 5] as the set of servers where Wk is stored, so that |Nk|
3Our proof is brute-force based in essence. This is the reason that we are not able to generalize this converse
proof. However, we are not aware of any setting where the best achievable rate given by Theorem 3 is not optimal.
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represents the number of servers where Wk is stored. We assume that |N1| ≥ |N2| ≥ · · · ≥ |N5|.
Therefore, we have a partition of the total storage of 12 messages.
12 = |N1|+ |N2|+ |N3|+ |N4|+ |N5|, |Nk| ∈ [1 : 3]. (114)
Note that |Nk| ≥ 1 because all messages must be stored somewhere and |Nk| ≤ 3 because we
only have N = 3 servers. Because of the range of |Nk| and the assumption of the monotonic
non-increasing property on the Nk sequence, we only have the following 2 cases.
Case 1: (|N1|, |N2|, |N3|, |N4|, |N5|) = (3, 3, 3, 2, 1) (115)
Case 2: (|N1|, |N2|, |N3|, |N4|, |N5|) = (3, 3, 2, 2, 2) (116)
For both cases, the storage design is deterministic (up to permutations of the servers). Denote
(pi1, pi2, pi3) as a permutation of the 3 servers (1, 2, 3). For Case 1, we have
Spi1 = {W1,W2,W3,W4} (117)
Spi2 = {W1,W2,W3,W4} (118)
Spi3 = {W1,W2,W3,W5} (119)
Using Lemma 1 for W4 and W5, we have
Dpi1 +Dpi2 ≥ L (120)
Dpi3 ≥ L (121)
(120) + (121)⇒ D1 +D2 +D3 ≥ 2L (122)
⇒ R = L
D1 +D2 +D3
≤ 1/2 < 2/3 (123)
For Case 2, we have
Spi1 = {W1,W2,W3,W4} (124)
Spi2 = {W1,W2,W3,W5} (125)
Spi3 = {W1,W2,W4,W5} (126)
Using Lemma 1 for W3, W4 and W5, we have
Dpi1 +Dpi2 ≥ L (127)
Dpi3 +Dpi1 ≥ L (128)
Dpi2 +Dpi3 ≥ L (129)
(127) + (128) + (129)⇒ 2(D1 +D2 +D3) ≥ 3L (130)
⇒ R = L
D1 +D2 +D3
≤ 2/3 (131)
Therefore, for both cases, the rate can not be higher than 2/3 so that the achieved rate of R = 2/3
is optimal.
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7.1.2 N = 4: Proof of R ≤ 3/4
The proof idea is similar. We consider a partition of the total storage of MN = 16 messages to the
K = 5 messages.
16 = |N1|+ |N2|+ |N3|+ |N4|+ |N5|, |N1| ≥ · · · ≥ |N5|, |Nk| ∈ [1 : 4],∀k ∈ [1 : 5]. (132)
For the partition, we have the following 4 cases.
1. (|N1|, |N2|, |N3|, |N4|, |N5|) = (4, 4, 4, 3, 1).
In this case, W4 and W5 are stored over 2 disjoint sets of servers. Using Lemma 1, we have∑4
i=1Di ≥ 2L so that R ≤ 1/2 < 3/4.
2. (|N1|, |N2|, |N3|, |N4|, |N5|) = (4, 4, 4, 2, 2).
This case is similar to that above, where W4 and W5 are stored over 2 disjoint sets of servers.
Then R ≤ 1/2 follows.
3. (|N1|, |N2|, |N3|, |N4|, |N5|) = (4, 4, 3, 3, 2).
The storage design is deterministic (up to permutation of the servers). Denote (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4)
as a permutation of the 4 servers (1, 2, 3, 4). We have
Spi1 = {W1,W2,W3,W4} (133)
Spi2 = {W1,W2,W3,W4} (134)
Spi3 = {W1,W2,W3,W5} (135)
Spi4 = {W1,W2,W4,W5} (136)
Using Lemma 1 for W3, W4 and W5, we have
Dpi1 +Dpi2 +Dpi3 ≥ L (137)
Dpi4 +Dpi1 +Dpi2 ≥ L (138)
Dpi3 +Dpi4 ≥ L (139)
⇒ 2(D1 +D2 +D3 +D4) ≥ 3L (140)
⇒ R = L
D1 +D2 +D3 +D4
≤ 2/3 < 3/4 (141)
4. (|N1|, |N2|, |N3|, |N4|, |N5|) = (4, 3, 3, 3, 3). The storage is also deterministic. We have
Spi1 = {W1,W2,W3,W4} (142)
Spi2 = {W1,W2,W3,W5} (143)
Spi3 = {W1,W2,W4,W5} (144)
Spi4 = {W1,W3,W4,W5} (145)
Using Lemma 1 for W2, W3, W4 and W5, we have
Dpii1 +Dpii2 +Dpii3 ≥ L, ∀ distinct i1, i2, i3 ∈ [1 : 4] (146)
⇒ D1 +D2 +D3 +D4 ≥ 4L/3 (147)
⇒ R = L
D1 +D2 +D3 +D4
≤ 3/4 (148)
All cases are covered and we always have R ≤ 3/4. The proof is thus complete.
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7.2 Example 1. M = 3, K = 7, N = 4 and Proof of R ≤ 2/5
We follow the same proof idea presented in the previous section for Example 2.
Consider a partition of the total storage of MN = 12 messages to the K = 7 messages.
16 = |N1|+ |N2|+ · · ·+ |N7|, |N1| ≥ · · · ≥ |N7|, |Nk| ∈ [1 : 4],∀k ∈ [1 : 7]. (149)
For the partition, we have the following 5 cases.
1. (|N1|, |N2|, · · · , |N7|) = (4, 3, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1).
In this case, 4 out of the 5 messages W3,W4,W5,W6,W7 (each appeares once) are stored over
4 disjoint sets of servers. Using Lemma 1, we have
∑4
i=1Di ≥ 4L so that R ≤ 1/4 < 2/5.
2. (|N1|, |N2|, · · · , |N7|) = (4, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1).
In this case, 3 out of the 6 messages W2,W3,W4,W5,W6,W7 are stored over 3 disjoint sets
of servers. Using Lemma 1, we have
∑4
i=1Di ≥ 3L so that R ≤ 1/3 < 2/5.
3. (|N1|, |N2|, · · · , |N7|) = (3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1).
Consider the last 4 messages W4,W5,W6,W7 (each appears once). If these 4 messages appear
in 3 servers, then similar as the case above, we have R ≤ 1/3. Henceforth, we focus on the
setting where these 4 messages appear in 2 servers. The allocation of these 4 messages to the
2 servers might be 3 + 1 or 2 + 2. It is easy to see that for both settings, W3 must appear
in the other 2 remaining servers so that we have 3 messages that appear in 3 disjoint sets of
servers, i.e., R ≤ 1/3.
4. (|N1|, |N2|, · · · , |N7|) = (3, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1).
Consider the last 3 messages W5,W6,W7 (each appears once). If these 3 messages appear
in 3 servers, then similar as the case above, we have R ≤ 1/3. Henceforth, we focus on the
setting where these 3 messages appear in 1 server or 2 servers.
When W5,W6,W7 appear in 1 server, the storage is deterministic. We have
Spi1 = {W1,W2,W3} (150)
Spi2 = {W1,W2,W4} (151)
Spi3 = {W1,W3,W4} (152)
Spi4 = {W5,W6,W7} (153)
Using Lemma 1 for W2, W3, W4 and W5, we have
Dpii1 +Dpii2 ≥ L, ∀ distinct i1, i2 ∈ [1 : 3] (154)
Dpi4 ≥ L, (155)
⇒
4∑
i=1
Di ≥ 5L/2, R = L∑4
i=1Di
≤ 2/5 (156)
When W5,W6,W7 appear in 2 servers, we have
Spi1 = {×,×,×} (157)
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Spi2 = {×,×,×} (158)
Spi3 = {×,×,W5} (159)
Spi4 = {×,W6,W7} (160)
where × represents place-holders for the remaining messages, W1 (will appear 3 times),
W2,W3,W4 (will appear 2 times each). By enumerating all possibilities, it is easy to see
that there exists 1 message out of W2,W3,W4 that appears only in Spi1 , Spi2 . Combining this
message with W5,W6, we have 3 messages that appear in 3 disjoint sets of servers and it
follows that R ≤ 1/3.
5. (|N1|, |N2|, · · · , |N7|) = (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1).
We have 2 possibilities here, depending on how many servers will be occupied by the last 2
messages.
When W6,W7 (each appears once) appear in 2 servers, there must exist 1 message out of
W1,W2,W3,W4,W5 that appears only in the 2 remaining servers. Similarly, we have 3 mes-
sages that appear in 3 disjoint sets of servers and R ≤ 1/3.
When W6,W7 (each appears once) appear in 1 server, we have (denote (γ1, · · · , γ5) as a
permutation of (1, · · · , 5))
Spi1 = {×,×,×} (161)
Spi2 = {×,×,×} (162)
Spi3 = {×,×,Wγ5} (163)
Spi4 = {Wγ5 ,W6,W7} (164)
where × represents place-holders for Wγ1 , · · · ,Wγ4 (each appears twice). By a similar rea-
soning as that in the above case, we must have 1 message out of Wγ1 , · · · ,Wγ4 that appears
only in Spi1 , Spi2 . Therefore, 3 messages appear in 3 disjoint sets of servers and R ≤ 1/3.
To summarize, no matter how we design the storage, the rate is always bounded above by 2/5
so that the proof is complete.
8 Discussion
Motivated by dataset privacy, we introduce the problem of private information delivery, where one
out of K messages is sent from a set of servers to a user while the delivered message index remains
a secret. We take an information theoretic approach to this problem and adopt the capacity as
the performance metric (parallel to the recent line of private information retrieval [4–7], where the
privacy of the user is considered). We propose information theoretic converses that capture this
privacy constraint and vector linear coding schemes that satisfy perfect privacy. The rate upper
and lower bounds are tight for a wide range of system parameters. We consider the elemental
model where the messages are replicated, the user behaves nicely, and a single message is delivered,
leaving much room for generalizations.
We have focused exclusively on the metric of rate while the amount of randomness is ignored.
The interplay between the communicate rate and the randomness size is an interesting future
direction. Further, we are taking a coarse look at the randomness as we assume the same random
21
variable is shared by all servers. It is not hard to see that this is not necessary and we only need the
randomness variables to be correlated. A finer view on the rate region of the correlated randomness
variables (instead of the sum randomness rate) will shed light on the consumption of randomness.
Finally, we mention the connection of the private information delivery problem to the anony-
mous communications problem [3, 8–10], where the identity that needs to be hidden is the trans-
mitters, receivers and their associations. Under many circumstances (e.g., [3]), the identity of the
delivered message in private information delivery is intimately related to the identity of the nodes
in an anonymous communication network. As a result, it is interesting to explore the implications
and extensions of the techniques in this work to anonymous communication networks.
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